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Jacqueline Cuozzo
Law and Sexuality – Final Paper
GOING HOME WITH MY(TRUE)SELF AT THE END OF THE NIGHT: HOW JESPERSEN V.
HARRAH’S TURNED HARD FACTS INTO GOOD LAW BY RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF
TITLE VII AND THE TRUTH THAT APPEARANCES MATTER

I.

INTRODUCTION

“Appearance rules the world.”1
Little argument can be made that appearances do not matter, particularly in a society as
media-driven and consumer-oriented as ours. We judge people based on their appearance, and
this reality is relevant to the ways in which businesses operate. What is less clear, however, is
the extent to which employers may regulate the appearance of their employees, particularly when
such regulation consists of gender-differentiated appearance codes. While the Supreme Court
has yet to hear a case challenging sex-discriminatory appearance codes, lower courts have
attempted to walk a fine line between satisfying the mandates of Title VII2 and maintaining some
level of employer discretion in regulating employee appearance.
The Ninth Circuit has been particularly involved in the development of Title VII law as
applied to dress and grooming requirements. In 2006, the court’s en banc decision3 rejecting a
Harrah’s Casino employee’s claim that the company’s mandatory makeup requirement for
women constituted sex discrimination proved especially controversial. Darlene Jespersen had
been a bartender at Harrah’s in Reno for twenty years, during which time she compiled an
exemplary record.4 But when the company decided to enforce a mandatory “Personal Best”

1

FRIEDRICH SCHILLER
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2010), provides: “It shall be unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” (emphasis added).
3
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
4
Id. at 1107.
2
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policy5 whereby male and female beverage service employees were required to comply with
certain appearance standards, Jespersen’s employment with Harrah’s came to a screeching halt.
Of the extensive guidelines set forth by Harrah’s, there was one that Jespersen absolutely refused
to follow: the requirement that all female bartenders where face powder, blush, mascara, and lip
color while at work.6 Jespersen did not wear makeup off the job and did not feel comfortable
wearing it on the job, either, as she claimed it “conflict[ed] with her self-image” and “interfered
with her ability to perform as a bartender.”7 Having been released from her employment with
Harrah’s due to her unwillingness to comply with the “Personal Best” policy, Jespersen brought
a Title VII action against Harrah’s which has generated a slew of controversy and criticism
among academics both inside and outside of the legal community.

5

The “Personal Best” policy provided, in relevant part:
All Beverage Service Personnel, in addition to being friendly, polite, courteous and responsive to
our customer's needs, must possess the ability to physically perform the essential factors of the job
as set forth in the standard job descriptions. They must be well groomed, appealing to the eye, be
firm and body toned, and be comfortable with maintaining this look while wearing the specified
uniform. Additional factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, hair styles, overall
body contour, and degree of comfort the employee projects while wearing the uniform.
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines:
Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/ female):
Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire.
Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted; no large
chokers, chains or bracelets. No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.
Males:
Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar.. Ponytails are prohibited. Hands and fingernails
must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No colored polish is permitted. Eye and
facial makeup is not permitted. Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non
skid) soles.

Females: Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down at
all times, no exceptions. Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee's
skin tone. No runs. Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or
length. Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles. Make up
(face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary [sic] colors.
Lip color must be worn at all times.
Id. at 1107 (emphasis in original).
6
Id. at 1107-08.
7
Id.
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Many critics have argued that the Ninth Circuit struck the wrong balance, paying an
unreasonable amount of deference to employer preferences that perpetuate the objectification
and subordination of women in the workplace.8 The soundness of this position rests on the
premise that makeup has historically served to reinforce the stereotype that women are inferior
beings whose primary value lies in their appearance. In this paper, I argue that the use of
makeup in our society is not intrinsically linked to a history of female subordination, but rather
reflects a social norm whose establishment, however deeply entrenched, does not implicate the
concerns of Title VII. Moreover, given that Darlene Jespersen’s case did not fit within the sex
discrimination theories upon which she relied, a decision rendering Harrah’s makeup
requirement unlawful would have carved out a new area of protection that is relevant to Title VII
concerns in only the most circuitous of ways: protection against discrimination based on
appearance. By objecting to employer appearance codes on the basis that these codes conflict
with one’s autonomy or self-image, employees would have virtually unbridled discretion to look
and dress however they pleased. Thus, had the Ninth Circuit provided such protection to
Darlene Jespersen, it would have created a slippery slope whereby the lawfulness of any
appearance requirement imposed on employees would become questionable.
This paper begins with an overview of Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence. Dress
and grooming code decisions analyzed under an undue burdens framework are discussed first,
followed by a summary of the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins9 and the sex stereotyping cases that have emerged therefrom. The Ninth Circuit’s
8

See, e.g., Diane Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of
Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13 (2007); Hilary J. Bouchard, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.:
Employer Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203 (2006); Alison J.
Hartwell, Makeup For Success: Why Jespersen v. Harrah’s Stifles Diversity By Promoting Stereotypes in
Employment, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 407 (2007); Allison T. Steinle, Appearance and Grooming Standards as
Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 261 (2006).
9
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s is then discussed against the backdrop of these cases. This
overview is followed by an evaluation of the Jespersen Court’s holding, as well as a discussion
of the criticisms that have urged courts to provide greater protections for employees subject to
dress and grooming standards, particularly when such standards are differentiated on the basis of
sex. This paper concludes with the proposition that Darlene Jespersen’s case did not
demonstrate a clear case of sex discrimination, but rather is more appropriately viewed as an
attack on employer regulation of employee appearance in general, the goal of which is
problematic from both a legal and an ideological standpoint.

II.

TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE: THE UNEQUAL
BURDENS TEST, PRICE WATERHOUSE SEX STEREOTYPING, AND THE
JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S DECISION

In Jespersen v. Harrah’s, Darlene Jespersen relied on two theories of sex discrimination
in arguing that Harrah’s makeup requirement violated Title VII, alleging that the “Personal Best”
policy discriminated against women by “(1) subjecting them to terms and conditions of
employment to which men are not similarly subjected, and (2) requiring that women conform to
sex-based stereotypes as a term and condition of employment.”10 While Jespersen’s first
“unequal burdens” 11 claim was rooted in an already well-settled theory of employment
discrimination, her second claim, based on the emerging “sex stereotyping” theory,12 required a
much more complex analysis due to the lower courts’ inconsistent application of the theory since
its inception in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.

10

Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
Id.
12
Id. at 1111.
11
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A. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS THEORY OF TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION
On its face, the text of Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an individual with respect to the terms or conditions of employment because
of that individual’s sex.13 As one commentator has noted, “[t]his is a sweeping command, with
great potential to eliminate employers’ economic leverage as a factor perpetuating many types of
discrimination.”14 And while Title VII provides an exception to this antidiscrimination rule,
allowing employers to hire and employ employees on the basis of sex “in those certain instances
where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonable necessary to the normal
operation of that particulate business or enterprise,”15 this exception (hereinafter the “BFOQ
exception”) has generally been read narrowly by the courts.16
For example, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,17 the Fifth Circuit held that sex
was not a BFOQ for the job of a flight attendant, despite the asserted superiority of women in
being sexually attractive to male passengers and comforting female passengers, because these
characteristics were peripheral to the airline’s essential concern with safety and transportation.18
In interpreting the word “necessary” as it appears in the text of Title VII’s BFOQ exception, the
court stated that the test is one of “business necessity,” not “business convenience.”19 The court

13

See 42 U.S.C.S. 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2010).
David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240, 243 (2004).
15
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2010) (providing an exception for employment decisions on the basis of religion and
national origin, as well as sex).
16
See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). The Supreme Court described the
limited applicability of the BFOQ exception as follows:
The wording of the BFOQ defense contains several terms of restriction that indicate that the
exception reaches only special situations in which discrimination is permissible to “certain
instances” where sex discrimination is “reasonably necessary” to the “normal operation” of the
“particular” business. Each one of these terms – certain, normal, particular – prevents the use of
general subjective standards and favors an objective, verifiable requirement. But the most telling
term is “occupational”; this indicates that these objective, verifiable requirements must concern
job-related skills and aptitudes.
17
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
18
Id. at 388.
19
Id.(emphases in original).
14

5

explained further that “discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the
business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one test exclusively,” and
went on to hold that “because the non-mechanical aspects of the job of flight cabin attendant are
not ‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation’ of Pan Am's business, Pan Am cannot
exclude all males simply because most males may not perform adequately,” regardless of
customer preference for female flight attendants.20
Despite the far-reaching language of Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate and the
limited circumstances under which the BFOQ exception applies, sex-differentiated dress and
grooming codes have largely evaded the proscriptions of Title VII because courts have been
reluctant to find that such requirements discriminate against employees “because of” sex as
envisioned by Title VII.21 However, where courts have found that a policy created an “unequal
burden” for one gender, such policies have been struck down as violative of Title VII’s ban on
sex discrimination. For example, in Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi.,22 the
Seventh Circuit addressed a policy which required female employees at a savings and loans
association to wear uniforms, while male employees were merely required to maintain business
attire. The rationale advanced by the employer for its separate dress codes was that it feared
women could not be trusted to choose appropriate work attire, and was specifically concerned

20

Id. at 388-89 (emphases in original).
See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (dismissing a challenge to a
policy that prohibited men, but not women, from having long hair); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantil Exch., 101 F.3d 907,
908 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding an employer policy that required male employees to have short hair but did not
require the same for female employees); Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987) (dismissing a
Title VII claim alleging that a grooming policy imposed unduly harsh requirements on women); Fountain v.
Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting a requirement that male, but not female,
employees wear ties); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a restriction
prohibiting long hair on male employees but allowing long hair on female employees as not discriminating on the
basis of sex); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F.Supp. 2d 1254, 1257 (finding a grooming policy requiring male
employees to maintain hair length above the collar acceptable under Title VII); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 229, 231(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a policy “that prohibits to both sexes a style more often adopted by
members of one sex” under a Title VII challenge).
22
Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979)
21
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that women would wear skirts that the employer considered inappropriately revealing.23 In
holding that the employer’s differential policy was “based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by
Title VII,” the court discussed how such disparate treatment was demeaning to female
employees, reasoning that “[w]hile there is nothing offensive about uniforms Per se, when some
employees are uniformed and others not there is a natural tendency to assume that the uniformed
women have a lesser professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business
clothes.”24
In the Ninth Circuit, the unequal burdens test has been developed in the context of several
airline cases addressing sex-differentiated weight restrictions for male and female employees. In
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,25 the court considered Continental’s imposition of strict
weight regulations for its female flight attendants, in the absence of any corresponding weight
restriction for male employees who performed the same or similar job functions. Touted by the
airline as a policy intended to “create the public image of an airline which offered passengers
service by thin, attractive women,” the court found that it imposed a “significantly greater burden
of compliance” on women, thereby resulting in sex discrimination.26 In the more recent case of
Franks v. United Airlines, Inc.,27 the Ninth Circuit similarly invalidated a weight policy that
imposed different standards for men and women in a way that applied less favorably to one
gender. While United’s weight maximums for female flight attendants corresponded to a
medium body frame standard, the maximums for male flight attendants generally corresponded
to a large body frame standard.28 Recognizing that “an appearance standard that imposes

23

Id. at 1033.
Id.
25
Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
26
Id. at 604, 606
27
Franks v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001).
28
Id. at 854.
24
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different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment,” the court
nevertheless found that United’s policy imposed greater burdens upon female employees, as
evidenced by the policy itself.29
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s familiarity with the unequal burdens test in the context of
physical requirements such as weight restrictions, unequal burdens imposed by a sexdifferentiated appearance code might also arise in the form of disparate costs or time required to
comply with a policy.30 Indeed, Darlene Jespersen relied upon both of these arguments in her
case against Harrah’s, though these arguments ultimately proved unsuccessful.31
B. PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX
STEREOTYPING THEORY
First articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1989 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 32
sex-stereotyping theory is a relatively recent and largely unresolved area of Title VII
jurisprudence. In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at a nationwide
accounting firm who had been selected for potential partnership.33 Although the firm’s partners
and Hopkin’s clients agreed that she was “extremely competent, intelligent,” “energetic and
creative” and an “outstanding professional,”34 her partnership was ultimately denied. Many of
the partners who objected to Hopkin’s candidacy did so on account of her aggressive, “macho”
personality,35 and she was told that her chances for partnership would improve if she would
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her

29

Id.
See Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 467, 470-71 (2007).
31
See infra Part II.C.2.
32
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
33
Id. at 231.
34
Id. at 234.
35
Id. at 235.
30
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hair styled, and wear jewelry.”36 Hopkins subsequently brought a Title VII claim against Price
Waterhouse, alleging that the firm discriminated against her on the basis of sex as to decisions
regarding the partnership.37
While Price Waterhouse is often recognized as having established the “Mixed Motive”
defense in Title VII cases,38 its expansion of the scope of Title VII to “sex stereotyping” has also
been influential in providing an alternative legal theory for Title VII plaintiffs.39 In finding that
sex stereotypes played an impermissible role in Hopkin’s performance evaluations, Justice
Brennan clarified the term “sex stereotyping” as it applies to Title VII:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group,
for “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes” . . . . An employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in
an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively
and out of a job if they did not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind . . . . The
plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decisions. In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence
that gender played a part.40
But while the Court in Price Waterhouse clearly announced that evidence of sex stereotyping is
relevant to the sex discrimination inquiry, it has been a difficult case for lower courts to apply
due to the Court’s unwillingness to clarify the standard of proof required to establish that sex

36

Id. (quoting findings made by the District Court for the District of Columbia in the decision below, 618 F. Supp.
1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
37
Id. at 231.
38
In the context of sex discrimination law, “mixed motive” refers to the principle that once a plaintiff has
established that gender played “a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it
had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
39
See Steinle, supra note 8, at 275.
40
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
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stereotyping played a part in an employment decision.41 Therefore, it is unsurprising that the
Jespersen Court so easily distinguished Price Waterhouse in rejecting Jespersen’s sex
stereotyping claim.42
The Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory has been met with the greatest success in
the context of same-sex harassment claims.43 It was the Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale v.
Sundower Offshore Services, Inc.,44 in combination with the groundwork laid by Price
Waterhouse, that sparked an interest in the development of this theory.45 In Oncale, the plaintiff
worked on an eight-man oil platform crew and alleged that he was harassed by his co-workers
because he was effeminate and thus “failed to meet the image of what a man should be like.”46
Although the thrust of the Court’s holding was its announcement that sex discrimination
consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII,47 Oncale also illustrated,
however implicitly, that extreme reactions to what is perceived to be gender-inappropriate
behavior can result in legal exposure under Title VII.48
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit relied upon both Price
Waterhouse and Oncale in holding that the plaintiff stated a viable claim based on sex
stereotyping theory that he was “discriminated against for acting too feminine.” 49

The

plaintiff, a waiter at Azteca Restaurant, alleged that he was subjected to persistent harassment by

41

See id. at 252 (“[W]e do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a
motivating role in an employment decisions, and we refrain from deciding here which specific facts . . . would or
would not establish a plaintiff’s case.”); see also Hartwell, supra note 8, at 424; Steinle, supra note 8, at 276 (noting
that “[l]ower courts must rely on the specific facts of Price Waterhouse and the Court’s vague language in
determining how far the Price Waterhouse decision extends, and in what contexts it applies.”).
42
See infra Part II.C.3.
43
See Selmi, supra note 30, at 473.
44
Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs.,523 U.S. 75 (1998).
45
Selmi, supra note 30, at 474.
46
Id. at 473.
47
See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
48
See 10-261 Lab. & Employ. L., Dress, Grooming, and Appearance Guidelines, MB § 261.03 (2010).
49
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).
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his co-workers because he “failed to conform to a male stereotype.”50 The court described this
harassment in the following terms:
[T]he systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that Sanchez did not
act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying his tray
“like a woman” - i.e., for having feminine mannerisms. Sanchez was derided for
not having sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend. Sanchez's male
co-workers and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded Sanchez that he did
not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, referring to him as “she” and
“her.” And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at Sanchez was cast in female
terms.51
Concluding that the abuse was closely linked to gender and therefore violated the Price
Waterhouse rule barring discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes,52 the Ninth Circuit drew
upon much of the same reasoning underlying Oncale, but in such a way that gave explicit
recognition to stereotyping theory.53
In other circuits that have decided sex stereotyping cases, these cases have generally dealt
with plaintiffs whose claims have somehow implicated their sexual orientation and/or sexual
practices.54 This has created a fundamental incoherence in that Title VII does not offer
protection for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, yet sexual orientation has served

50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Selmi, supra note 30, at 474-75. For a similar case in which the Ninth Circuit held that sex stereotyping
theory provided a grounds for relief under Title VII, regardless of the fact that the plaintiff stated he was harassed
because he was gay rather than because of stereotyping, see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
54
See, e.g. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transsexual fire fighter who
expressed a more feminine appearance when undergoing treatment for Gender Identity Disorder and who was
subsequently driven out of the department by his superiors stated a Title VII claim for his “failure to conform to sex
stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.
2005) (applying Salem to affirm a verdict of $575,00 based on a sex-stereotyping claim for a pre-operative
transsexual police officer who was denied a promotion for not being masculine enough); but see Vickers v. Fairfield
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s sex stereotyping claim and finding that the harassment
of which plaintiff complained was more properly viewed as harassment based on his perceived homosexuality,
rather than based on gender non-conformity, and thus not protected by Title VII).
51
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as a relevant factor in determining whether sex stereotyping occurred.55 In any event, because
Darlene Jespersen’s claim focused on her appearance rather than her perceived sexual
orientation, it is difficult to analogize her case to the recent trends in gender stereotyping
jurisprudence.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S OPERATING CO.
1. Facts and Procedural History
Darlene Jespersen was by all accounts a spectacular bartender during her twenty year
tenure at Harrah’s Casino,56 which began in 1979 and came to an unfortunate end in 2000.57
Throughout Jespersen’s entire term of employment, the company maintained a policy
encouraging female beverage servers to wear makeup on the job.58 It was not until 2000,
however, that the policy became mandatory,59 thereby precipitating her termination by and
subsequent lawsuit against Harrah’s. The “Personal Best” program at issue in her case contained
certain appearance standards that applied equally to both male and female employees, including
a “standard uniform of black pants, white shirt, black vest, and black bow tie.”60 However, the
policy also included several sex-differentiated requirements pertaining to hair, nails, and
makeup.61 For example, male employees’ hair could not extend below the top of the shirt collar,
and female employees’ hair had to be teased, curled, or styled every day.62 Of the
comprehensive guidelines set forth by the “Personal Best” program, there was only one provision
55

See Selmi, supra note 30, at 479 (observing that recent gender stereotyping cases have “restored the confusion
Oncale was intended to eliminate” because “the courts are again evaluating the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, as well
as the identities of the harassers, to determine whether a claim is cognizable,” and arguing that the extension of Title
VII to discrimination based on sexual orientation would simplify the law).
56
See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (en banc)
(describing Jespersen as a “valued, experienced employee who had gained accolades from her customers”).
57
See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F.Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D.Nev. 2002).
58
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
59
Id.
60
Id. For a detailed version of the policy’s relevant appearance guidelines, see supra note 5.
61
Id.
62
Id.
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to which Darlene Jespersen was adamantly opposed: the requirement that all female bartenders
wear makeup.63
The provision specifically provided that for female bartenders, “[m]akeup (face powder,
blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly and in complementary colors,” and “[l]ip
color must be worn at all times.”64 Darlene Jespersen, a “nearly six-foot tall, broad-shouldered
woman with a down to earth persona,”65 did not wear makeup off the job, and soon found that
she could not wear it on the job without sacrificing her performance as a bartender.66 Jespersen
found makeup both uncomfortable and incompatible with her self-image, and she therefore
refused to comply with the company’s policy.67 Harrah’s subsequently released Jespersen from
her employment, and she thereafter brought suit against the company on the grounds that the
“Personal Best” program discriminated against women by subjecting them to unduly
burdensome conditions of employment and requiring them to women conform to sex-based
stereotypes.68
The district court granted Harrah’s motion for summary judgment on all of Jespersen’s
claims,69 and a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.70 The panel held that although
grooming policies could violate Title VII as a matter of law, Jespersen nevertheless failed to
show that the “Personal Best” program imposed a greater burden on women than on men.71
Moreover, the panel interpreted Price Waterhouse as applying to appearance standards only in
situations where the policy amounted to sexual harassment, which required a showing that the
63

Id. at 1107.
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
65
Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight Against the Barbie-fication of Bartenders, 14
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 285 (2007).
66
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107-08.
67
Id. at 1108.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1106 (citing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F.Supp. 2d 1189 (D.Nev. 2002)).
70
Id. (citing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)).
71
Id. (citing Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081-82).
64
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plaintiff suffered harassment for failure to conform to gender stereotypes.72 The Ninth Circuit
thereafter took the case en banc, reaffirming the judgment of district court and panel majority on
somewhat different grounds.73
2. The Unequal Burdens Claim: An Insufficient Record Proves Fatal
The first claim advanced by Jespersen was that by subjecting women to terms and
conditions of employment to which men were not similarly subjected, Harrah’s “Personal Best”
policy created an unequal burden on women which amounted to sex discrimination.74 The court
rejected Jespersen’s argument that the makeup requirement itself was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory intent that must be justified by Harrah’s as a BFOQ,75 stating
that the settled law “does not support [the] position that a sex-based difference in appearance
standards alone, without any further showing of disparate effects, creates a prima facie case.”76
Citing Gerdom v. Continental and Frank v. United, the court conceded that some grooming and
appearance policies may place a greater burden on one gender than another in violation of Title
VII, but held that it could not find as such here without further evidence of the burdensome
nature of Harrah’s makeup requirement.77 It described the policy in Gerdom, where the weight
restriction was “part of an overall program to create a sexual image for the airline,” as clearly
distinguishable from Harrah’s policy, which “applied to both male and female bartenders, and
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was aimed at creating a professional and very similar look for all of them.”78 Citing to a long list
of cases which have recognized that employers may adopt grooming standards that appropriately
differentiate between the genders, the Jespersen Court refused to accept that Harrah’s policy, on
its face, amounted to anything more than “slight differences in appearance requirements for
males and females” that “have only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.”79
Jespersen’s failure to create a record establishing that the “Personal Best” program was
unduly burdensome for female employees thus foreclosed any chance of success under this
theory. Refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that “it costs more money and takes more time
for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with the
requirement that he keep his hair short,” the court indicated that documentation or other evidence
of the relative cost and time required by men and women to comply with Harrah’s policy was
necessary for a prima facie showing of unequal burdens.80
3. The Sex Stereotyping Claim: Failing to Fit Within the Legal Framework
As the case law on stereotyping theory suggests,81 Darlene Jespersen’s second claim
alleging that the “Personal Best” program discriminated against women by requiring them to
conform to sex-based stereotypes82 was a far more difficult concept for the Jespersen Court to
apply, as Jespersen’s case did not fit neatly within the existing legal framework.83 Ultimately,
the court relied on factual distinctions between Price Waterhouse and subsequent Ninth Circuit
cases interpreting sex stereotyping theory in the context of Title VII, as well as its independent
judgment that the record failed to establish evidence of stereotypical motivation by Harrah’s, to
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reject Jespersen’s claim that the makeup requirement constituted unlawful discrimination due to
sex stereotyping.84
The court began by reciting the holding in Price Waterhouse that in order to establish that
“‘gender played a motivating part in an employment decision,’ a plaintiff in a Title VII case may
introduce evidence that the employment decision was made in part because of a sex
stereotype.”85 Nevertheless, the court found Price Waterhouse distinguishable in that the
stereotyping to which Ann Hopkins was subjected rightfully interfered with her ability to
perform at work.86 Because the criticisms of Hopkins’ superiors, such as the recommendation
that she “take ‘a course at charm school,’”87 were intended to discourage the aggressive behavior
that allowed her to achieve professional success in the first place, impermissible sex stereotyping
was clear since “the very traits that she was asked to hide were the same traits considered
praiseworthy by men.”88 Harrah’s policy, on the other hand, did not single out Jespersen the way
Hopkins had been singled out in Price Waterhouse, and “there was nothing to suggest the
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a women’s ability to do the job.”89 Moreover, in
viewing the makeup requirement in the context of the overall “Personal Best” program, the court
stated there was “no evidence . . . to indicate that the policy was adopted to make women
bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear.”90
The court felt that the only evidence of stereotyping offered by Jespersen was her “own
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subjective reaction to the makeup requirement,”91 which was clearly insufficient to support her
claim.
Acknowledging its respect for Jespersen’s “resolve to be true to herself and to the image
that she wishes to project to the world,” the Ninth Circuit went on to reason that if Jespersen’s
personal objection to the makeup requirement alone were enough to support a sex stereotyping
claim, the court would “come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or
her self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination.”92 The court conceded that had
Harrah’s intended its policy to be sexually provocative or portray its female bartenders as sex
objects, Jespersen would have had a viable claim.93 In actuality, however, Jespersen was
required to wear a unisex uniform that covered her entire body94 – a far cry from what most
would consider provocative or sexy.
Turning to cases from the Ninth Circuit that have addressed sex stereotyping claims after
Price Waterhouse, the Jespersen Court then distinguished the case at bar from those where
sexual harassment had occurred. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant and Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, the Ninth Circuit had applied Price Waterhouse’s holding that “sexual harassment of an
employee because of that employee’s failure to conform to commonly-accepted gender
stereotypes is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.”95 Both cases dealt with claims that
the plaintiff had endured harassment for failing to “‘act as a man should act’”96 or “conform to
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commonly-accepted male stereotypes.”97 Despite the fact that Nichols and Rene did not involve
dress or grooming codes, the court stated that those cases nevertheless “provide the framework
for this court’s analysis of when sex stereotyping rises to the level of sex discrimination,” and
found that Jespersen’s case was conceptually inconsistent because “Harrah’s actions [did] not
condone[ ] or subject[ ] Jespersen to any form of alleged harassment.”98 Moreover, unlike the
plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, the court found that Jespersen had not been treated any differently
than the other Harrah’s bartenders (both male and female), and therefore considered her claim
materially different than Ann Hopkins’ insofar as Harrah’s appearance guidelines “[did] not
require Jespersen to conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to
perform her job requirements as a bartender.”99 Although the court acknowledged that a
cognizable claim of sex stereotyping on the basis of appearance codes is possible, it ultimately
held that Jespersen failed to provide sufficient evidence that such a violation occurred here:
This record . . . is devoid of any basis for permitting this particular claim to go
forward, as it is limited to the subjective reaction of a single employee, and there
is no evidence of a stereotypical motivation on the part of the employer. This
case is essentially a challenge to one small part of what is an overall apparel,
appearance, and grooming policy that applies largely the same requirements to
both men and women . . . . [I]n commenting on grooming standards, the
touchstone is reasonableness. A makeup requirement must be seen in the context
of the overall standards imposed on employees in a given workplace.100
4. The Dissents: Expanding Price Waterhouse and Appreciating Women’s Makeup Woes
Of the eleven circuit judges who heard oral argument, four judges dissented in two
separate opinions. Judge Pregerson agreed with the majority that Jespersen failed to create a
sufficient record in support of her unequal burdens claim.101 However, he challenged the
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majority’s finding that Harrah’s policy was not motivated by sex stereotypes, and felt that
“[q]uite simply, her termination for failing to comply with a grooming policy that imposed a
facial uniform on only female bartenders [was] ‘because of sex’” and therefore incompatible
with Title VII’s demand that “‘gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.’”102 Looking
to the language of Price Waterhouse, Judge Pregerson considered Jespersen’s failure to present
additional evidence immaterial to her second claim, arguing that “little is required to make out a
sex-stereotyping – as distinct from an undue burden – claim in this situation.”103 Because Price
Waterhouse refused to delineate the type or quantity of evidence required for a prima facie
showing of sex stereotyping, the judge deemed “the fact that Harrah’s designed and promoted a
policy that required women to conform to a sex stereotype by wearing full makeup” sufficient
evidence of discrimination.104
Criticizing the majority’s failure to consider the makeup requirement separately, Judge
Pregerson worried that analyzing the policy through such a broad lens allowed the discriminatory
nature of the makeup requirement to be disregarded when considered in light of other provisions
of the policy that either had burdensome effects on the opposite gender or applied to both
genders in a neutral way.105 The judge interpreted Harrah’s makeup requirement as demeaning
to women in much the same way as the female-only uniform policy in Carroll v. Talman,
attributing Harrah’s actions to the “cultural assumption – and gender-based stereotype – that
women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full makeup.”106
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Judge Kozinski similarly took issue with the majority’s treatment of Jespersen’s
stereotyping claim, but also wrote a separate dissent to voice his disagreement with the finding
that Jespersen did not present sufficient evidence that the makeup requirement created an
unequal burden for women.107 The judge argued that judicial notice should have been taken of
the substantial time and costs associated with the makeup requirement relative to the
corresponding grooming requirements for men, reasoning that “[y]ou don’t need an expert
witness to figure out that [makeup doesn’t] grow on trees . . . [n]or is there any rational doubt
that the application of makeup is an intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable
time and care.” 108
Notwithstanding his disagreement with the majority’s refusal to take judicial notice,
Judge Kozinski also argued that Jespersen’s testimony that she found it burdensome to wear
makeup because it conflicted with her self-image and interfered with her job performance
constituted relevant evidence to the unequal burdens inquiry which should not have been
dismissed.109 Emphasizing the “intensely personal choice” involved in wearing cosmetics, the
judge described women’s makeup-wearing as a “cultural artifact” and implied that this cultural
norm should give way to less antiquated notions of what a “real women” look like.110

III.

AN EVALUATION OF JESPERSEN V. HARRAH’S: RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF
TITLE VII’S REACH
A. THE UNEQUAL BURDENS CLAIM
Despite Judge Kosinski’s appeal for judicial notice that Harrah’s makeup requirement

imposed certain onerous burdens on female employees, the majority’s finding that Jespersen
failed to provide sufficient evidence that a significant burden of compliance attended the makeup
107
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requirement, but not any corresponding grooming requirement for male employees, was
consistent with the settled law addressing unequal burdens in the context of Title VII. As
touched upon by the court,111 had Jespersen been required to wear a particularly suggestive outfit
or been similarly objectified in complying with Harrah’s policy, the court would likely have been
receptive to her claim.112 But Jespersen did not claim that the policy’s unequal burden stemmed
from Harrah’s attempts to “sex her up” in order to increase business,113 and the court was
therefore justified in treating her case like those where the courts condoned sex-differentiated
grooming policies absent tangible evidence that the policies imposed a greater burden of
compliance on one gender. Under this framework, and refusing to take judicial notice of the
strains on time and cost associated with wearing makeup, Jespersen’s undeveloped record was
fatal to her unequal burdens claim.
An argument may be made that the Ninth Circuit was overly pragmatic in its unequal
burdens analysis, failing to consider the emotional and/or psychological detriments that women
like Jespersen suffer as a result of mandatory makeup policies.114 But this line of reasoning fails
to recognize that asking courts to engage in such a delicate inquiry may not only be difficult, but
altogether unfeasible. As one legal scholar was apt to point out, “we should be skeptical of
courts’ ability . . . to discern uncomparable burdens, particularly because the burdens may
actually be incommensurable.”115 Because Jespersen’s case hinged largely on her psychological
reaction to Harrah’s policy, the undue burdens test was simply an inappropriate avenue for relief.
The incongruity of this framework to the facts in Jespersen was actually conceded by an attorney
111
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who had represented Jespersen in her appeal to the Ninth Circuit’s panel, as this attorney
explained how “the more we considered the ‘equal burdens’ test, the more the exercise of
comparing very different ‘burdens’ seemed illogical and incoherent.”116
Moreover, as asserted by Michael Selmi in his analysis of Jespersen v. Harrah’s, whether
the court was right as to the unequal burdens claim is probably insignificant in the grand scheme
of Jespersen’s case. 117 Selmi explains this position as follows:
If she had prevailed on the unequal burdens argument, the policy may very well
have stayed in place, with the company perhaps supplying the makeup to reduce
the cost burden on women. The company might also have reacted by increasing
the burdens on the male employees, perhaps by requiring them to shave daily, put
gel in their hair, or something along those lines. Similarly, prevailing on the
undue burdens tests would not have advanced the law; rather, this would have
been an application of a limited but well-established legal principle.118
Therefore, while the Ninth Circuit’s unequal burdens analysis in Jespersen is somewhat
unsatisfying in its overly-formalistic approach, the court was constrained by the doctrinal
limitations of the legal theory advanced, and the unequal burdens claim nevertheless proved to
be a less important aspect of the case in the overall context of evolving Title VII jurisprudence.
B. THE SEX STEREOTYPING CLAIM
The far more complicated issue in Jespersen was whether Harrah’s makeup policy
constituted sex discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping as envisioned by Title VII and set
forth in Price Waterhouse. The facts in Jespersen did not fit neatly within the existing line of
cases interpreting the Supreme Court’s expanded view of Title VII protection, which has
generally applied stereotyping theory to harassment or other adverse employment actions
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directed at an individual on the basis of his or her perceived gender nonconformity.119 The Ninth
Circuit was reasonable to point out the conceptual difficulties in attempting to apply the Price
Waterhouse theory to the unfamiliar context of appearance codes, and was warranted in
distinguishing Jespersen on that basis.
However, the additional justification for its holding, that “[t]here is no evidence . . . to
indicate that the policy was adopted to make women bartenders conform to a commonlyaccepted stereotypical image of what women should wear,”120 is at first hard to swallow. Many
critics have argued that the Jespersen decision perpetuates and reinforces harmful stereotypes of
women as merely “ornamental, objects of beauty to be contemplated, not agents with talents to
be esteemed.”121 Although this position is not without reason, it nevertheless overstates the
symbolic significance of makeup in our society and understates its practical significance in
attractiveness judgments. In the absence of convincing evidence that makeup serves a more
significant social function than as a marker of attractiveness, but rather continues to operate as an
emblem of women’s inferiority, the courts should not be expected to eradicate appearance codes
in the workplace merely because they embrace socially constructed, gender-differentiated
appearance norms.
119
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Feminist scholars have made much of the damaging impact of beauty practices on
women, and legal scholars have relied on these critiques in analyzing Jespersen.122 For example,
feminist scholar Sheila Jeffries posits that “[b]eauty practices show that women are obedient,
willing to do their service, and to put effort into that service. They show . . . that women are not
simply ‘different,’ but, most importantly, ‘deferential.’”123 Yet despite this radical stance,
Jeffries concedes that “[t]here is little research on the reasons why women wear makeup or
engage in other forms of ‘grooming,’ the effects that these practices have on women’s feelings
about themselves and others, and their interactions with the public world.”124 It is therefore
difficult to conceive why a court should be responsible for prohibiting appearance standards such
as makeup requirements on the basis that they perpetuate stereotypes of women as inferior, when
there is inadequate research linking makeup use with female oppression.
In fact, historian Kathy Peiss’ research on the economic enterprise of beauty and its
interactions with and influences on cultural and social developments in modern America reveals
a far different story.125 In discussing the evolution of the beauty business as we know it today,
Peiss highlights the important role played by women in small-scale beauty enterprises during the
nineteenth century and onward.126 According to Peiss, it was the “seamstresses, hairdressers,
beauticians, department store buyers, and cosmetics saleswomen” that “made beauty and fashion
122
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integral to the lives of women,” and these beauty businesses “opened opportunities for . . .
women by aligning commercial enterprise with the very ideals of femininity and beauty that had
long justified women’s exclusion from most lines of work.”127 These female-operated
businesses shifted the beauty ideal away from one that “celebrated inner, moral beauty,” and
toward a “new emphasis on external appearance and its cultivation through the purchase and use
of cosmetics and other beauty aids.”128 This account is clearly inconsistent with the feminist
critique of “[t]he beauty practices that women engage in” as “those of political subordinates.”129
And while there may be some truth to the claim that the cosmetics industry has served to exploit
women’s appearance anxieties that stem from our society’s tendency to evaluate a woman’s
worth based on beauty,130 this position fails to appreciate the complex history of women and
makeup use. Kathy Peiss’ extensive exploration of America’s beauty culture reveals a much
richer portrayal:
Women have used makeup to declare themselves – to announce their adult status,
sexual allure, youthful spirit, political beliefs – and even to proclaim their right to
self-definition.
As in the past, cosmetics offer aesthetic, sensory, and
psychological pleasures to those pressed by the obligations of home and work.
And women still perceive beautifying as a domain of sociability, creativity, and
play.131
Thus, despite the broad proposition of one eminent legal scholar that “few femaleassociated dress or appearance conventions exist that are not linked with stereotypes about
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women that emerged from or have become interwoven with their historically inferior status,”132
it is not at all clear that makeup is one of these appearance conventions. This scholar calls for an
aggressive approach from the courts in challenging employment practices grounded in
community norms, and proposes that courts attempt to “identify the cultural meanings
underlying them and determin[e] to what extent they impose burdens that disadvantage a
member of one sex in relation to the other.”133 Yet even under this approach, the cultural
meanings and attendant burdens associated with makeup use are not so clearly debasing or unfair
that the equality concerns of Title VII are plainly implicated in Jespersen.
Although the suggestion that makeup use is a marker of long-standing female
subordination has been overstated by many critics of Jespersen,134 this is not to say that such
beauty practices fail to reflect any important social conventions whatsoever. Indeed, social
science research has consistently found that both men and women who judge photographs of
women with and without makeup deem those wearing makeup more physically attractive than
those without.135 These findings seem to suggest that the makeup policy at issue in Jespersen
should be interpreted not as reinforcing a sex stereotype, but rather as reflecting a societal reality:
in our culture, women generally are more attractive when wearing makeup
The difference between stereotypes and social truths, albeit nuanced, is nonetheless
significant when considering whether Harrah’s makeup policy implicated Title VII concerns. A
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stereotype is a rigid and simplistic belief about the characteristics of members of some specified
social group.136 Yet an individual’s belief that women are more attractive when wearing makeup
is not the type of attitude that constitutes stereotypical thinking – it simply demonstrates that
individual’s perception of physical attractiveness, and therefore his or her subjective reality.
That personal perceptions of beauty are influenced to at least some extent by culturally specific
standards137 does not make them any less true, nor does it necessarily render such perceptions the
product of overly simplistic attitudes which contribute to the type of sex stereotyping protected
under Title VII. Therefore, unless Title VII is to be expanded to provide protection against the
regulation of employee appearances in general, the fact that businesses recognize that women are
generally considered more attractive when wearing makeup is irrelevant for Title VII purposes.
This of course begs the question whether employers’ regulation of employees’
appearance, and particularly regulation that differentiates on the basis of gender, should be
prohibited if it conflicts with an employee’s autonomy and/or self-identification. Such drastic
protection for employees and severe interference into the business judgments of employers not
only runs counter to well-established principles of employment law,138 but it also sends the false
136
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message that appearances do not matter. Unlike equality of race, sex, religion, and national
origin, equality based on appearance has never been a goal of our society,139 and it is not the job
of the courts to dictate which traits are and are not socially salient and meaningful.140

IV.

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION OF APPEARANCE
CODES IN THE WORKPLACE
Given that Darlene Jespersen’s opposition to Harrah’s makeup requirement could not be

validated on the basis of Title VII sex stereotyping, the lingering question underlying the
Jespersen decision is whether courts should prohibit workplace dress and grooming codes
merely because they embrace socially constructed, gender-differentiated appearance norms. I
maintain that unless we wish to live in a faceless society whereby natural human interaction is
artificially suppressed141 or wish to harm American businesses in order to pursue the
questionable goal of transforming the workplace into “a place for expressive activities or a place
to pursue our authentic identity,”142 the answer to this question must be no.
The controversy concerning whether and to what extent employers should be able to
enforce mandatory appearance requirements centers around two competing interests: the interest
of employers in creating a corporate image that is tailored to consumer preferences, and the
interest of employees in “being saved the identity, time, and economic costs involved in adhering
to” 143 such policies. One approach that would allow employers to regulate employee
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appearances to some degree yet prevent employers from fashioning policies that adopt
community-based appearance norms and consequently burden individuals who do not conform
to such norms would be to allow only trait-neutral dress and grooming codes. But as one legal
scholar has pointed out, employers would likely respond to this constraint by “narrow[ing] the
range of trait options available to their employees to only those that the employer [finds]
acceptable when possessed by either sex,” thus forcing employees to “converge toward an
androgynous mean.”144 Not only is such androgyny likely to burden individuals of one sex more
than the other since there is really no single hair or clothing style that “looks equally good and is
equally socially acceptable on women and men,”145 it also fails to represent an ideal to which our
society should aspire.
As noted by Robert Post in discussing the problems associated with “anti-lookism”
philosophy,146 “social relationships characteristically transpire through the medium of
appearances.”147 In only allowing for sex-neutral dress and grooming requirements, the law
would put forth the dishonest message that an individual’s face, voice, body and gestures do not
constitute critical aspects of that individual’s personhood. Equating nondiscrimination with such
strict neutrality not only shrouds society behind a “veil of ignorance” that “strip[s] away all
‘accidents of natural endowment and . . . contingencies of social circumstance,’”148 but also
“diminish[es] the freedom of everyone while increasing that of no one.”149 Such an outcome
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would clearly be undesirable for all those affected by this type of stringent appearance code
regulation.
A converse approach to the workplace appearance issue would be to ban mandatory dress
and grooming requirements altogether so as to allow employees to express their true “social
identities”150 while at work. Although such broad protection for appearance cannot be justified
on Title VII grounds151 nor under any other established area of the law,152 many have argued that
the current state of the law is inadequate and should be expanded so as to provide appearance
protection in the employment realm.153 I argue that this view, although not without merit,
nevertheless minimizes the negative impact that such unbridled discretion may have on
employers while overstating the value of freedom of dress at work.
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Of the scholars who propose large-scale reform in the area of appearance protection, most
do not place much emphasis on the plight of the employer,154 or simply refuse to accept that such
reform would have a significant effect on the bottom line of many businesses.155 Yet as
previously discussed, the presentation of appearances in everyday life is a vital component of
human interaction, and it would be misguided to emphasize the importance of appearance in
identity formation but fail to acknowledge that perhaps above all else, appearance is the medium
through which we judge one another. As such, employee appearances will undoubtedly affect
customer satisfaction rates in service-based industries such as bartending, and the use of dress
codes is therefore a significant marketing strategy that is vital to the success of many
businesses.156
At the same time, these scholars who give short thrift to the importance of employee
appearances on customer satisfaction levels also view the workplace as an environment in which
an employee’s identity should be created and expressed, particularly through the mode of
dress.157 For example, Karl E. Klare’s argument that the law should eliminate mandatory
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appearance policies and instead foster personal autonomy suggests that one goal of this type of
reform is to increase the “eroticization” of the workplace.158 He describes this goal as follows:
Work becomes understood as an arena of personal gratification and self-discovery
and particularly a locus for encountering, communicating with, and in some cases
forming personal relationships with other people. In this view it would be
appropriate that the rules of workplace dress and appearance be relaxed to permit
greater on-the-job experimentation, imagination, play, enjoyment and expression
of sexual autonomy.159
However ambitious, this proposition depicts an unrealistic image of the workplace as a place
where, once employees are free to dress as they please, autonomy and personal expression will
rule the day. Yet “this idea of self-autonomy runs counter to the constraints of the
workplace,”160 and it is difficult to conceive how eliminating dress codes could transform the
workplace into an environment in which individuals feel free to, and in fact have the ability to,
express their authentic selves.
Although work is an undeniably important aspect of most people’s lives, there is
nonetheless a distinct separation between our personal lives and work lives. As noted by
Michael Selmi, the workplace is “a place of uniforms and conformity, a place where we go to be
someone else, to perform for someone else . . . to earn a living, to make friends perhaps, but
more importantly, to earn money that allows [us] to enjoy the other parts of [our] lives.”161 And
even if we take the word “uniforms” out of the equation, the result will remain largely
unchanged – as perhaps it should. The more we rely upon the workplace to act as a forum for
identity, authenticity, or self-expression, the less emphasis we may place on our lives outside of
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work.162 Ultimately, this will only serve to frustrate our ability to express our authentic selves,
as the intrinsic nature of the workplace can never allow for the type of true freedom that we
experience at home.
Dress codes and uniforms may be uncomfortable, confining, at odds with an employee’s
self-image, or just plain ugly. But in the end, the law’s broad approval of employers’ reasonable,
nondiscriminatory appearance codes best reflects our society’s dual interests in providing
businesses freedom from undue government interference and ensuring that the liberty and
equality rights of citizens are not infringed upon. To argue for complete protection against
workplace appearance standards is both an unrealistic and problematic goal which mistakenly
equates the ability to control one’s public image with the realization of one’s authentic identity.
We should neither expect nor want the workplace to become the principal forum for the
expression of our authentic selves, and should instead appreciate that our “homes,” be them
literal or figurative, foster and allow us to express our true identities in a way that the workplace
never can.

V.

CONCLUSION

Darlene Jespersen’s tale is not one of triumph, nor is it one that inspires much faith in
humanity. Why a loyal, hard-working, and successful employee of over twenty years should be
forced out of a job over such a seemingly trivial issue as makeup is a question that lacks a
satisfactory answer, and it is difficult to regard Harrah’s actions against Jespersen as anything
but callous. Jespersen’s case was indeed one of hard facts, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision
162
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could have given credence to the adage that hard facts make bad law. Ultimately, however, the
Jepsersen Court stayed true to the law and to its limits in shaping that law, thereby avoiding a
more benevolent but legally unsound result.
In recognizing that Jespersen’s case failed to establish sufficient evidence of unequal
burdens and did not fit within the legal framework of sex stereotyping as set forth in Price
Waterhouse and thereafter interpreted by the lower courts, the Ninth Circuit properly applied
Title VII and its existing body of law to the facts and came to the proper conclusion. Moreover,
the court was right to be wary of stretching the law in such a way as to achieve a favorable result
for Jespersen, sensitive to the slippery slope that such broad protection against employer
appearance codes would likely create. Essentially, had the Jespersen decision gone the other
way, the Ninth Circuit would have carved out a new area of protection for discrimination based
on appearance. Such protection is justifiable neither on legal grounds nor by the interests of
society. If courts were to declare all employer appearance requirements unenforceable, they
would place an unreasonable burden on employers, particularly those in service-based industries,
by demanding that workplaces ignore the importance of appearances in the business world.
Rather than force an idealistic yet insincere worldview upon employers whose businesses may be
seriously undermined without the ability to regulate the appearance of employees, courts should
continue to give deference to employers’ reasonable decisions regarding dress and grooming
requirements.
Therefore, I ultimately submit that who we are at work does not automatically dictate
who we are at home, nor should we necessarily aspire to blur the work/home dichotomy by
treating the workplace as a playground for self-expression and identity formation. For in the
end, whether makeup-free or caked in cosmetics, Darlene Jespersen had one identity as far as
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Harrah’s was concerned: that of a bartender. A unique hairstyle or outfit could not have changed
that fact. Yet once Jespersen walked out of the casino at the end of each shift, she was no longer
a mere bartender. Perhaps she was a daughter, a sister, a friend, a baker, a musician, an avid
reader, or a world traveler; she could have been all of these things and more. These things,
whatever they may have been, are what constituted Darlene Jespersen’s true self, and while her
role as a bartender may not have been able to accommodate this authentic identity during work,
her true self – the most important of identities – was still waiting for her when she returned home
each night.
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